The following article was published by Sean Donahue of New Hampshire Peace Action.

The submarines Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle once called "The Auschwitz of Puget Sound" are about to begin carrying deadlier and more accurate nuclear missiles.

"If Kitsap County (Washington) were its own country, it would be the world's 3rd largest nuclear weapons power" according to the Ground Zero Center for Nonviolent Action, a peace community just outside Seattle. The Bangor Naval Base in Bremerton, Washington is the home to the Navy's Pacific fleet or eight Trident submarines, armed with ballistic missiles. Each sub carries 24 missiles armed with up to eight warheads, making Bremerton homeport to a submarine fleet that can carry up to 1600 100 kiloton nuclear warheads -- an arsenal larger than the combined nuclear arsenals of Britain, France, and China.

Now that arsenal is about to become more deadly. Four of the subs, which now carry the first generation Trident missile, the D-4, are being converted to carry the more accurate, longer range D-5 missile, and may also be given newer, warheads sometime in the next few years. The Navy is considering converting the other four, which are older, into a new cruise missile sub which could launch 152 missiles in one attack. Two newer subs from the Atlantic Fleet are also being moved to Bangor.

ONE SUB COULD DESTROY A COUNTRY

With frighteningly appropriate echoes of Dr. Strangelove , the Navy boasts in the most recent issue of its Undersea Warfare magazine: "The TRIDENTs carry a MIRVed missile in each of their 24 missile tubes. MIRV is the acronym for Multiple, Independently targeted, Re-entry Vehicle, meaning that after reaching the target vicinity the missile's warhead splits apart into as many as ten smaller nuclear bombs aimed at ten different targets with computer-controlled accuracy. How this works - and the precise number of reentry vehicles in each warhead - is secret, but the tremendous fact is that a single broadside from such a submarine - all 24 missiles fired at the same time - can destroy any nation on the face of the earth. No nation - and this includes our own - could even hope to function, or even continue to exist, in the face of such a salvo. Incontrovertibly, the TRIDENT submarine with this fantastic armament will prove to be the dooms-day weapon imagined by scientists, statesmen, and historians since the term was invented." No single ship has ever been capable of carrying out this level of destruction before.

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) have become the backbone of the US nuclear force because they have certain advantages over land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's.) According to Bob Aldridge, a former nuclear missile engineer for Lockheed who is now active in the peace movement: "Submarine-launched Trident missiles have important advantages over ICBMs. They can reach their targets in 10-15 minutes as compared to 30 minutes for an ICBM. They can approach those targets from all directions from unknown launch points, as opposed to only over the north pole for ICBMs launched from fixed silos of targeted locations. Those advantages would confuse detection and greatly enhance the element of surprise which is needed for a first strike. On top of that, Trident missiles hold enough warheads to provide a first-strike force all by themselves, against any adversary, while remaining invulnerable to a sneak attack. Trident missiles, supported by extreme low frequency (ELF) submarine communications and NAVSTAR satellite navigation corrections, make ICBMs obsolete."

Furthermore, as Admiral Richard Mies of the US Strategic Command writes: "TRIDENT submarines have a unique ability to move undetected to any launch point. This mobility provides [nuclear commanders] with the option of holding at risk virtually any spot on earth, while avoiding overflight concerns. Submarine launched ballistic missiles can be readily retargeted, providing additional flexibility". In other words, as long as the US has nuclear missiles deployed on Trident subs, every country in the world needs to be constantly aware of the fact that it could be obliterated by in 10-15 minutes by an attack launched from a single US submarine.

Trident submarines can carry one of two types of missiles: The older subs currently carry Trident I C-4 missiles armed with up to eight 100 kiloton nuclear W76 warheads. By comparison, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima , which killed 150,000 people, had an explosive force of 12 kilotons. These warheads are designed to explode above in the air above a city, spreading fallout over a wide area. The government stopped production of the C-4 in 1987 because it wasn't considered accurate enough for use in a first strike against another nuclear power.

Bob Aldridge writes: "C-4 missiles are not precise enough, and the Mark-4/W-76 warheads not powerful enough, to destroy sufficient silos for a first strike without outside navigation aid. With its one-dimensional stellar inertial guidance (SIG) system the missile follows a single star as a guide toward its target. This system of updating the inertial navigation package provides an accuracy of about 750 feet." But the US Space Command has enhanced the C-4's navigational capabilities by deploying the NAVSTAR satellite system, increasing the missile's accuracy to the point where it can be used as a first strike weapon against missile silos. According to Aldridge: "If the missiles, themselves, received in-flight course corrections from NAVSTAR satellites they could deliver the bombs within 300 feet of their targets. By sending two warheads from different missiles to the same target, known as 2-on-1 cross targeting, the probability of destroying a hardened missile silo would be 93 percent. Such a hard-target capability would establish the Trident-1 as a true first-strike weapon."

But the US wanted a more powerful missile, so it began producing the Trident II D-5 missile. The ten East Coast Tridents stationed at Kings Bay, Georgia (including the two that are being reassigned to the Pacific) already carry the D-5 missile, and four of the Pacific Tridents are being refit to carry the newer missiles. The first of these subs, the USS Alaska, began the conversion process this spring. General Dynamics is making the new missile tubes for the subs at its plant in Pittsfield, MA.

According to Aldridge, the D-5's "have the accuracy and quick delivery time necessary to decapitate command posts, as well as demolishing silos." The missile is accurate within 400-500 feet without satellite guidance, because it bases its navigation on two stars, not just one. Some of the D-5's carry 8 475 kiloton W88 warheads. However, because of severe safety problems with the W88 (see below) only 400 of these warheads were produced; so most D-5's cary 8 W-76 warheads. All of the west coast Tridents presently carry the older and less accurate C-4 missiles, although the Navy hopes to backfit the D-5 into four of them.

ACCIDENT RISKS

The Trident II D-5 missile system, especially when it includes a W-88 warhead, is more likely to be involved in a accidental nuclear explosion than any other system in the US arsenal. According to an article in the Puget Sound Navy News about the refurbishment of the Pacific Trident fleet, a scientific panel established by the House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Dr. Sydney Drell of Stanford, found in 1990 that there was a significant danger that a W-88 warhead would detonate by accident.

According to the article, there are three serious design flaws: "Unlike other missiles, warheads on the D-5 are mounted in very close proximity to the rocket motor --they are actually arranged in a circle around the propellant fuel in the rocket's third stage. Warheads on most other American ballistic missiles are arranged on a platform, which allows some insulating material to rest between the warheads and a potential fuel fire. The D-5 has no such protection. Worse, those rocket motors use a highly volatile propellant. The big difference? Although both fuels will burn, only the 1.1 class stands risk of exploding accidentally. It is virtually impossible to detonate the 1.3 class propellant --and it is precisely this detonation that could trigger the most frightening scenarios.

In most bombs, the primary nuclear material is surrounded by high explosive. These high explosives, when detonated, initiate the nuclear yield from the warhead --and the final design issue centers on them. Weapons designers had to decide whether to use the traditional, relatively unstable explosives -- called "high explosives," or "HE"--or an especially safe kind of explosive, which possesses "a unique insensitivity to certain abnormal environments," such as fires, crashes or unexpected impacts. Unlike the conventional explosive, this material--known as "insensitive high explosive," or "IHE"--is extremely unlikely to detonate in any of these crises. It also is not used in the D-5 missile system. This increases the risk of an accidental explosion in an unforeseen emergency."

According to Bob Aldridge, the Drell Commission was also disturbed that in choosing which plutonium "pit" (the radioactive material in a warhead which is detonated by the conventional explosive and in turn sets off a thermonuclear explosion in the hydrogen in the warhead) to use in the W88 warhead, weapons designers didn't use safer fire resistant pits which can withstand temperatures of 1000 degrees Fahrenheit. However Aldridge also points out that since rocket fuel burns at 2000 degrees Fahrenheit, the Fire Resistant Pit isn't much safer than a regular pit when used in a warhead carried by a missile.

According to a study by the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) (Britain has Tridents too) the Trident missiles themselves are very prone to explosion: "If a missile is dropped or if an object collides with it, then it could explode. A missile accident could occur during missile test firing, in particular when the 1st stage motor is ignited on the surface. There are also procedures to jettison a missile to prevent a missile accident. Jettisoning a missile could result in an impact between a missile and the hull. [ . . .] In a complex accident situation there may not be sufficient control over the vessel to tilt it to one side: ."The electromagnetic hazard to rocket fuel is a recognised hazard. An explosion of a rocket motor at the Morton Thiokol factory where Trident rocket motors are made has been attributed to this phenomenon. Given the large amount of electrical and electronic equipment on a submarine there is the potential for this to initiate an accident.

The effect of a Trident D5 missile explosion can be gauged by the arrangements which would be made in the event of an accident during the rail transport of rocket motors. If a fire reaches the cargo compartment then everyone, including fire fighters should be evacuated to at least one mile from the scene. Further indication of the force of the blast is evident in procedures surrounding Trident D5 tests at Cape Canaveral. These tests only took place under certain atmospheric conditions because of the fear that a rocket motor explosion could damage the nearby town and only essential personnel were allowed to remain within the test area.

The potential for a sophisticated rocket system to go wrong was shown when the space shuttle Challenger exploded in mid air. The explosion was initiated by a failure in a solid fueled booster." The accidental detonation of a 100 or 475 kiloton nuclear warhead would be a disaster of unprecedented proportions -- remember, we are talking about warheads that are 8 - 40 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Most of the population of the Seattle area would die or become seriously ill from the fallout, and fallout would spread across Washington. It is unclear what would happen to the other warheads at the submarine base if this happened. At best the plutonium in the pits of each warhead would become part of the debris of the explosion, greatly increasing the lethality of the fallout. In an even more frightening scenario, the other warheads might detonate, resulting in an explosion of apocalyptic proportions.

Short of detonation, a missile fire could result in a plutonium fire, leading to the release of the toxic and radioactive material , which could be carried over long distances in the wind and water. In either case, large portions of Washington State and the surrounding ocean would remain contaminated for a period of time longer than the history of life on earth.

NEW WARHEADS?

The Navy and the Department of Energy may be preparing to provide the refurbished subs with new or upgraded warheads.. They are working together on a project called the "Submarine Warhead Protection Program" designed to explore options for increasing the lethality of the submarine-based nuclear arsenal.

According to a recent article by Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, plans are already underway to begin modifying existing W-76 warheads. The Pentagon and the DOE are planning: "an upgrade of the arming, firing, and fuzing components of the most numerous warhead in the U.S. arsenal, the 100-kiloton W76. This upgrade would give these 3,200 air-burst warheads a near-ground-burst capability, making them extremely lethal against hardened targets. Unless another upgrade is chosen or the program delayed, the new fuze is slated to begin entering the stockpile in late fiscal 2004."

Mello says the plan goes beyond modifying adding new parts to old warheads though; "Beyond the arming, firing, and fuzing (AF&F) project, the Energy Department is attempting to provide the navy with two certifiable new warhead options to augment its stock of high-yield W88s. One would involve a "mature design," which could go into production by fiscal 2004. It would use a recycled--and thus "pretested"--plutonium pit and possibly a recycled thermonuclear secondary. [. . . ] The other would utilize an entirely untested design, which is supposed to be certifiable soon enough to achieve a "first production" date of fiscal 2007. [. . . At least one of these two designs--or possibly yet another warhead-is slated to eventually replace what the navy called in 1995 the "exiting" W76 and W88 warheads."

These "improvements" serve only one discernible military purpose - to enable the United States to launch a large scale nuclear first strike against another nuclear power. Of course, every move we make toward increasing our first strike capability discourages the Russians from reducing their reliance on their nuclear arsenal. The nuclear establishment's nostalgia for the Cold War threatens to plunge us into renewed hostilities with Russia.

WILL TRIDENT BE USED?

Russian missile silos may not be the only potential targets for Trident missiles. Since the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon has been looking for a new justification for maintaining its nuclear arsenal. A 1991 Strategic Air Command study provided a rationale for using nuclear weapons on a limited scale against a Third World dictator. Aldridge explains:

"When in late 1991 Air Force General Lee Butler, then director of US nuclear targeting, convened the Joint Strategic Target Planning Advisory Group, he set in motion the crafting of post-cold war nuclear doctrine. Under the chairmanship of former Air Force secretary Thomas Reed, this so-called Reed Panel made four far reaching recommendations which point a significant finger toward the tactical use of Trident missiles. These were explained more thoroughly in another paper but will be reviewed here in context.

"The first of these was to retain a significant number of strategic nuclear weapons to preserve America's prestige and dissuade nuclear proliferation by countries such as Germany and Japan. This did not relate too much to tactical situations but let us go on. The second recommendation was that America should rethink its 1979 pledge not to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country. Since chemical and biological weapons are now classed as weapons of mass destruction the Reed Panel's rationale was that nuclear weapons should be used to deter their use, also. Thirdly, the Reed Panel suggested that nuclear arms be used to protect America s interests through preventing hostilities in the Third World by targeting countries that have never been targeted before. The purpose of this would be to prevent annihilation of states such as Israel or Taiwan, or the seizure of critical raw materials such as oil, or foreign dominance in a sector of space.

"The fourth recommendation tied all this revised nuclear doctrine together and pointed to Trident as the centerpiece. The Reed Panel outlined a 'Nuclear Expeditionary Force' armed with a few air-launched and submarine-launched strategic weapons. What the Reed Panel was referring to was a tactical Trident." Butler would later resign his post and call for the abolition of nuclear weapons. But the Reed Panel's recommendations have been at least partially adopted by the Pentagon."

During the Gulf War the US made veiled threats that if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons, the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons. In 1995 this stance became official US policy when the Pentagon's nuclear posture review confirmed that the United States was prepared to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for any attack that used weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical, or biological. This represents a clear violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which bans the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

According to Aldridge, that same year "Defense Budget Director Andrew Krepinevich emphasized the need for long-range precision strikes against missile emplacements and other facilities far behind enemy lines. The capability to do this exceeds the performance record of even the smartest conventional bombs." The media, Hollywood, and the Pentagon are continually painting nightmare scenarios involving terrorists using chemical and biological weapons. Recently, Portsmouth went through a series of disaster drills designed to test emergency crews' readiness to deal with a biological or chemical weapons attack. We can expect the Pentagon and the weapons industry to play on the fear of biological and chemical weapons to justify continuing to spend money on nuclear weapons. And there is a growing chance that these weapons might eventually actually be used to retaliate for or prevent a biological or chemical attack.

TRIDENTS AND TOMAHAWKS

While the Navy is converting four Tridents to carry D-5 missiles, it is also considering converting the four oldest Trident subs into a new ship--the submerged arsenal ship, or SSGN. Part of the reason for this change is that the Navy is required by the START II treaty to reduce the number of warheads on its SLBM's.

Initially the Navy planned to do this by putting four warheads each on 24 missiles on each of its 18 Tridents. However, it proved more cost efficient to place 5 warheads each on the 24 missiles on each sub in a 14 sub fleet. But this left the Navy with four unarmed submarines, so it decided to convert them to carry cruise missiles. These modified Trident subs could carry up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles with either nuclear or conventional warheads as well as special vehicles that could be used in Navy SEAL operations. The sub could launch all 154 Tomahawks in six minutes. By comparison, the Navy fired 220 Tomahawks in the course of the entire war in Yugoslavia last year, and 330 Tomahawks in the course of several weeks during the devastating December 1998 attack on Iraq in 1998.

It's mind-boggling to imagine that in two six-minute waves two submarines could launch more Tomahawk missiles than the US used in the entire war in Yugoslavia. The Tomahawk is already the US's weapon of choice because it can be fired from a great distance and cause tremendous damage without putting US sailors at risk. The US fired over 630 Tomahawks in one nine month period from August 1998 through April 1999 at targets in Afghanistan, the Sudan, Iraq, Serbia, and Kosova (see December 1999 issue of New Hampshire Peace Action News).

Being able to launch these missiles without warning from a submarine that can remain hidden for months would make the Tomahawk an even more tempting weapon to use. The Navy's Undersea Warfare magazine explains: "The operational impact on potential adversaries is [ . .. ] compelling. Opposing forces react defensively to observable events, such as positioning strike platforms within reach of potential targets. This results in our striking targets that were emptied or otherwise rendered less valuable because the enemy had time to prepare. If a strike platform is covert, the unpredictability and subsequent impact of its operations would be greatly magnified. Additionally, the inherent ability of the submarine to conduct intelligence and indications-and-warning operations only improves the commander's situational awareness and ability to get inside the enemy's decision loop to maximize any strike/[Special Operations Forces ie. Navy SEAL] operations."

According to the same article: "The advantages of having these ships, armed with a significant number of advanced land attack missiles and [Special Operations Forces], are compelling. For example, during recent operations against Iraq, and also in the Kosovo conflict, several SSNs and surface ships were required to be on hand continuously for strike operations. As the number of ships in the fleet shrinks and each ship's individual capability grows, the relative value of each hull increases. This translates to increased opportunity cost for each ship that is unavailable to perform the full spectrum of missions for which it was designed. With a TRIDENT SSGN available to cover strike tasking, the remaining ships in the Iraq and Kosovo scenarios would have been available for other missions, such as reconnaissance, anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, theater missile defense, or maritime interdiction operations, or any of the advanced warfare missions that today's Navy provides. This increased operational flexibility is an extremely attractive tactical advantage, which an SSGN could provide."

Congress appropriated $13 million for the development of these subs last year, and Electric Boat of Groton, CT, has invested $1 million of its own money in researching this potential submarine conversion. There is a great deal of skepticism about this project. Some say that the estimated $11 billion the conversions would cost is too much money to spend on converting old subs. Others point out the arms control problems that the conversion poses -- it would be difficult for Russia to verify that the four subs no longer carried strategic nuclear missiles; and because Tomahawk missiles can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads nations that have signed arms control treaties with the US having Trident submarines armed with Tomahawk missiles would make Russia nervous.

On the other hand, the Pentagon has a long history of spending exorbitant amounts of money on dubious projects and of twisting the words of arms control treaties to meet its own needs, so it is too soon to rule out the possibility that the Navy may go ahead with the conversions.

CONCLUSION

The Navy has taken advantage of public ignorance and apathy regarding the US nuclear arsenal to push ahead with its Trident conversion projects. Along with the push to develop a National Missile Defense system in violation of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, these new developments will give Russia the impression that the US is no longer interested in arms control. This is a dangerous message to be sending at a time when Russia is facing increasing political and economic instability.